INTRODUCTION
The introduction of atomic weapons into warfare at Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, permanently altered the implications of armed combat between nations. Ever since that day the possibility of nuclear attack has obsessed the strategic planning of all nations. In 1982, powerful forces are pressing for expansion of military nuclear power on the one hand, and for plans to reduce nuclear armaments on the other. International movements among physicians have emphasized the anticipated total breakdown of medical services after nuclear attack, and the consequent impotence of the medical establishment. Health professionals of both the East and West are attempting to persuade the political decision makers that the breakdown of medical support after a nuclear attack would be so widespread that even the ordinary measures of sanitation and first aid would be virtually destroyed for long enough to cause a high rate of disability in the target population from malnutrition, infection, and the consequences of "ordinary" trauma, in addition to the widely publicized effects of radiation.
It is not necessary to imagine these effects. Hiroshima shows clearly what happened in a small town subjected to a single small bomb which produced virtually no residual radiation in the bombed area. At Hiroshima and later at Nagasaki, the damage was localized and external medical support was available. The results of more widespread attacks can be visualized simply by considering what might have happened at Hiroshima if it had been impossible to obtain medical support within the first few hours from Japanese and, some days later, from American military medical organizations.
The Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine (38: 61-239, 1965 ) published a diary kept by Dr. Averill Liebow during the period shortly after the bombing of Hiroshima, when he was sent to that city as part of an American medical task force assigned to collaborate with the Japanese physicians in undertaking a study of the medical effects of the bomb. This effort ultimately led, in 1948, to the establishment of the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, a joint effort of Japanese and American scientists supported by both the Japanese and American governments, which carried out highly productive studies of the effect of the bomb on the health and genetic integrity of the victims of the blast. Dr. Liebow's diary gives a clear picture of the nature of the damage created by the blast, of the way in which support was mobilized for the survivors, and of the initial steps in studying the effects of the bombs. The Yale Journal has decided to reprint a portion of the diary (somewhat edited to reduce emphasis on personal details) in the hope that those who read it today will attempt to translate this experience into the vastly greater threat of our time. What follows is considerably condensed from the original. In addition, a small amount of referenced material has been added when it could provide a more quantitative indication of the situation than Liebow provided in his diary. Editor-in-Chief, The Yale Journal ofBiology and Medicine Dr. Liebow's Diary:
HIROSHIMA RETROSPECT Hiroshima ("broad island") is really a delta cut into six islands by the branches of the River Ota. Here lived some 250,000 people, plus an encampment of soldiers of the Chugoku Army near the center. The hills rise sharply on two sides of the delta, which points its apex to the north. It is as if a great flatiron had been pressed from the direction of the sea into the mountains. Only the truncated cone of Hijiyama rising to 70 meters in the southeast sector interrupts the flatness.
Most of the houses were of traditional Japanese construction, consisting of one or two stories and built of wooden lathwork and clay. A central heavy tree beam runs longitudinally supporting arch-like ties, which support a lattice of struts that brace the heavy roof of overlapping pantiles. Most of the modern buildings were of the heavy construction necessitated in this land of earthquakes. These were situated along the main street at the southern boundary of the military encampment and also along the broad thoroughfare which ran at right angles directly south from the main entry of the reservation. These buildings were not in a cluster, but were separated by rows of wooden shops and dwellings. There were few buildings of weight-bearing brick since these are the most subject to damage by earthquake. Typical Japanese cities built in this fashion tend to be swept by disastrous fires at an average interval of about eight years, but the ordinary houses, quick to burn, can as quickly be rebuilt. The open charcoal braziers (hibachi) useful for warmth and cooking are a constant hazard. In this city of islands the branches of the Ota made natural fire breaks, but the separate islands were themselves large and densely crowded. In recognition of the danger of fire, especially under air attack, the citizens even before April 1945 had organized patriotic working parties (Giyutai) In a military sense at least, the army base might be considered a legitimate target, yet it was strange that before August 1945 Hiroshima had escaped almost unharmed. Desultory raids between the middle of March and the 30th of April 1945 had inflicted almost no damage. During the early summer our propaganda had broadcast threats that a number of cities, including Hiroshima, would be destroyed. The population was tense in expectation. Yet on August 6, the element of surprise was complete. Four B-29 bombers were sighted over Hiroshima early in the morning but shortly after 7:00 A.M. they withdrew to the northwest. Just after 8:00 three planes returned, but the all-clear had sounded 45 minutes before. Since there was no large concentration of hostile aircraft, the people went about their business as they had been told. At that moment Hiroshima was a city going to work. Farmers were already in the fields on the outskirts of the city. The streets were filled. Children had already reported to the schools or for service in clearing fire breaks. Customers had arrived in the banks but had not as yet been admitted to the floor. It was a time when the hazard of direct exposure in the open was close to its peak.
One of the planes was seen to release several objects by parachute and then at 8:14, despite the brightness of the morning, survivors were startled by a prolonged and brilliant flash like that of a gigantic magnesium flare. Accompanying the flash of light was an instantaneous flash of heat traveling with the speed of light and perceptible as far away as Ninoshima, the beautiful conical island five miles across Hiroshima Bay. The heat affected exposed objects with an intensity inversely proportional to the square of the distance from the epicenter. Its duration was probably less than one-tenth of a second and its intensity was sufficient to cause nearby flammable objects, particularly when dark, to burst into flame and to char poles as far as 3,600 meters away from the hypocenter. At 550-650 meters it was sufficient to chip and roughen granite by unequal expansion of its components. The heat also produced bubbling of tile to about 1,100 meters. It has been found by experiment that to produce this effect a temperature of 1,800°C acting for four seconds is necessary, but under these laboratory conditions the effect is deeper, which indicates that the temperature was higher and the duration less during the Hiroshima explosion. Only directly exposed surfaces sustained flash burns; intervening objects prevented the charring or other alteration in the directly exposed surfaces and thereby cast "shadows." The sharpness of shadows cast by constantly moving objects like leaves also suggest the brief duration of the flash. Thousands of persons in the open within a radius of 4 km sustained more or less severe flash burns depending on distance and the protective effect of clothing.
After an interval evident to those at a distance came a violent shock wave that flattened the fragile wooden buildings. As seen from the hills the houses fell as under a scythe. People were hurled from where they were standing. Those closest-by heard almost no sound except for that of falling buildings, but at a distance there was a rumbling roar like that of thunder. The blast wave shot outwards at approximately three km per second for a relatively short distance, but then after several yards fell to the speed of sound (approximately 1,000 meters/second). It rose to a sharp peak, and then the pressure fell below atmospheric for a period perhaps three times that of the positive blast. Objects at a distance were deflected away from the center of the blast, but such objects as trees immediately beneath remained standing upright although stripped of branches. The magnitude of the downward pressure was shown by "dishing" of the reinforced concrete roofs of buildings. Glass and other debris shot through the air like bullets, often becoming impacted in wood and inflicting multiple serious injuries. Simultaneously a roiling cloud, pink or black according to various observers, rose from the point of the explosion; this together with immense quantities of dust from the ground and from the collapsing buildings, threw those beneath it into almost total darkness, which lasted for some twenty minutes. Thousands were trapped in the wreckage. Almost all of those who could not escape under their own power perished. Fires beginning everywhere both by direct ignition and by the upsetting of thousands of open hibachi, many still in use for cooking breakfast, at once swept the city. A high wind sucked toward the rising atomic cloud fanned the flames which then created their own fire storm. The human victims suffered burns both by flash and by flame.
As soon as the atomic nature of the explosion was announced a new fear made itself felt -the terror of the invisible. The existence of radiation effects was known almost at once. People who had been close to the hypocenter but who had suffered neither burns nor trauma sickened and died. They felt weak and nauseated, could not eat, developed severe diarrhea and fever, and some died within ten days. Those who survived longer lost their hair; hemorrhages and ulcers appeared in the skin and mucous membranes, and death resulted from pulmonary or interstitial infections. The marrow had been destroyed and all elements of the blood were depleted.
If the intent of the bombing was demoralization, this was unquestionably achieved. False rumors spread -that all who had been in Hiroshima and Nagasaki would die, and that the cities would be uninhabitable for 75 years. But there was yet another effect. Those in power in Japan who were wise had clearly seen that the war had been lost when Okinawa and Iwo Jima fell. The Emperor had personally sought to influence his war councilors to sue for peace. Now, in the face of unanticipated and unprecedented power that could overwhelm even the most valorous, there was a way to conclude the war without losing face -and the fighting was brought to an end.
Only glimpses can be obtained from accounts of survivors of the immense medical problems created by an atomic explosion in a densely populated city. Those who lived were dazed not merely by the immediate force of the explosion but by its vast extent. Many lost consciousness for a few seconds or minutes even though they had not suffered trauma to the head. Darkness interrupted by onrushing fires added to the confusion and terror. No one knew which way to escape. The river banks and their waters were natural havens and were soon teeming. Boats were mobilized to carry survivors upstream. Only a few could be brought out on litters or carts, and almost all who could not rescue themselves were overwhelmed by the flames. Almost 75 percent of those who were within a radius of two km from the epicenter died in the first day of trauma, blast, or heat damage. Both administrative authority and organized activity had ceased to exist. What was done was on individual initiative. Only three of 45 hospitals in the city remained in partially functional condition (Fig.  1) . The two largest and most modern, the Red Cross Hospital and the Communications Department ("Post Office') Hospital, were so severely damaged by blast, as was their equipment, that they could function only as first-aid stations. Less than ten percent of the city's 300 physicians were uninjured and nursing strength was equally depleted, over 90 percent of the 1,800 nurses and orderlies in the city before the bomb having been either killed or injured. Moreover, although about 85 percent of the medical supplies remained intact, the quantity available was much too small to meet the needs of the injured [1] . THE EARLY MEDICAL RESPONSE As the fires cooled relief work began. The first relief station from outside was set up on the afternoon of August 6 at Tamon in the shelter of Hijiyama. By August 7, approximately 2,200 civil defense workers had moved into the city, and 33 emergency clinics were established, manned by 150 physicians [1] . Thousands The physicists also noted the "shadows" cast on various objects as a result of the heat flash. By sighting along these shadows they were able to establish through a process of triangulation the position of the explosion. It is amusing that this datum, widely known among scientists in Japan in the second week of August, was considered a secret in the United States for many months.
Medical investigations were begun at once and some of the earliest autopsies were performed at the Iwakuni Naval Hospital. At the Communications Department Hospital careful records were kept of approximately 150 patients, and autopsies were performed by Professor Tamagawa of Okayama University in a makeshift autopsy room on the grounds of the institution. The Prefectural Hospital at Kusatsu was active until November 1945. Autopsies were performed there by Professor Araki of the Kyoto Prefectural University. Patients were transferred to military hospitals at Okayama and elsewhere and to civilian institutions and hospitals as far away as Osaka and even Tokyo. In these settings investigative work and necropsies were also performed.
One of the most important investigative units was that maintained by the superbly staffed Tokyo Dai Ichi Military Hospital at Ujina. It had been customary for many of the best young Japanese physicians from the major universities to be recruited into the military soon after receiving their medical degrees. Of this group, Majors Motohashi, Misono, and Hata later made valuable contributions to the work of the Joint Commission. In addition, they had collaborated with physicians of the Tokyo Imperial University who had sent investigating groups into Hiroshima and had also received materials for study at the University in Tokyo. A report concerning 712 of these patients was completed by personnel of the Tokyo Dai Ichi Military Hospital and represents an important original document.
A major tragedy was suffered by the highly competent group of investigators headed by Professor Mashita of the Kyoto Imperial University. They took up residence at the Ono Army Hospital in the village of that name on the coast a few miles south of Hiroshima. During the great typhoon of September 17, a landslide roared down from the steep hills behind the hospital to the sea, crushing several buildings in its path and carrying to their deaths ten of the finest medical scientists in Japan, including the famous hematopathologist, Professor Sugiyama.
Among some of these groups of investigators there existed a certain jealousy of what might be called intellectual property, and communications among them were not free. Such attitudes are not unique to Japan but tend to prevail among scientific communities throughout the world. With a few major exceptions, these teams considered particular aspects of the problems in hand. Under difficult circumstances, the generally high quality of the studies performed is remarkable.
ORGANIZING AN AMERICAN INVESTIGATIVE EFFORT
In retrospect, it seems strange that a well-staffed and well-equipped medical team had not been organized by General Kirk, the Surgeon General of the U.S. Army, for the specific function of performing an intensive investigation of biological effects of the atomic bomb. It was said that the Surgeon General had not been informed of the planned employment of this weapon against the cities. Furthermore, General Kirk's personal relationships with General MacArthur were reported to be strained. We know that he had, during his tour of the Western Pacific in 1945, been refused permission to land in the Philippines. Rumor had it that years earlier when Kirk was in command of a military hospital in the Philippines he had declined to admit MacArthur as a patient because the latter was then serving in a civilian capacity.
The need for a thoroughgoing medical study was clearly perceived by Dr. Ashley After the GHQ group landed in Japan on September 1, 1945, it was learned that various groups of Japanese scientists had already conducted medical investigations on the patients in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Contact was established with the Japanese Government on September 3, and thereafter reports were received and liaison maintained through the GHQ Surgeon's Office.
At about this time a group from the "Manhattan District," the organization that carried the responsibility for developing the atomic bomb, arrived in Japan. Its mission was to conduct a brief preliminary study of the effects for an immediate report to Washington. The major function was to determine whether there was residual radioactivity in order to safeguard our troops. In charge of the medical section of this group was Dr. Stafford L. Warren, whose civilian position was that of Pro- fessor of Radiology at the University of Rochester, who was well known to Dr. Oughterson from civilian life. At a conference on September 4, 1945, it was agreed that it was desirable to unify the information to be obtained in a joint medical report. The group made a preliminary survey of physical damage and of casualties in various hospitals and clinics. After the physicists had confirmed that only minimal radioactivity, well within the limits of safety, was present, the group returned to Tokyo. There was only one localized but intense focus of radioactivity in the ashes of one of the crematories, which was traced to a radium source that had been used for treating a uterine tumor.
INITIATION OF JAPANESE-AMERICAN COOPERATIVE STUDIES: FORMATION OF THE JOINT COMMISSION
It was obvious that for an intensive medical study the cooperation of the Japanese, who had already made all of the clinical and laboratory observations during the height of the early phase, was essential. Professor Masao Tsuzuki, the Head of the Department of Surgery of the Tokyo Imperial University and Director of the Medical Division of the Japanese Research Council, was contacted. He agreed to enlist the full cooperation of Japanese medical scientists. As a result General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander, directed the formation of a "Joint Commission for the Investigation of the Medical Effects of the Atomic Bomb in Japan." This was to include the Manhattan District Group while still in Japan; a GHQ study group still to be organized, which was to perform a more definitive medical study; and the Japanese Government Group under Professor Tsuzuki. Later, on September 25, there arrived a medical investigating team of U.S. Navy personnel under Dr. Shields Warren, which was assigned to Nagasaki. With their arrival it was obvious that duplication or conflict of effort would be ridiculous and the Navy group then worked as part of the Joint Commission in full cooperation with the U.S. Army and Japanese components in Nagasaki.
On September 18, 1945, members of the 39th General Hospital, the Yale Unit, stationed on Saipan in the Mariana Islands, received orders to proceed to Japan to assist in studies of the effect of the atomic bomb. Those involved included Dr. Liebow, a pathologist; Dr. Jack D. Rosenbaum, a specialist in metabolic diseases; Dr. George V. LeRoy; and sergeants John Archimbault and Jack Reed, laboratory technicians. Dr. Herman Tarnower, an internist who had been stationed on Guam, joined the group en route. Although the team departed on September 18, they did not arrive in Tokyo until late on the afternoon of September 21. The delay was partly due to the overtaxed state of military transport and the need to break the trip down into short hops. It was also in part because General MacArthur had forbidden any planes except those of the U.S. Army to land at the Tokyo airfield. Since the only transportation available was in naval planes, the group was forced to land across the harbor from Tokyo and was ferried then, by marine airforce planes, to Yokohama, whence they were driven to Tokyo. The trip skirted the eastern and southern margins of the typhoon which struck Hiroshima on September 21 and resulted in destruction of the Ono Hospital, as described earlier.
On A preliminary briefing by Captain Nolan, a representative of the Manhattan District, indicated that a Japanese officer, Major Motohashi, who was then convalescing in Tokyo, was familiar with the fate of the troops who had been stationed in Hiroshima at the time of the blast. He was to provide valuable information for later evaluation. The absence of residual radioactivity on the ground was also confirmed. The group reviewed a preliminary nine-page report of Japanese observers from the Ujina Branch Hospital, which described 500 patients who were received immediately after the blast. Those who had suffered burns and had been within the "zone of radiation injury" had a much worse prognosis than burned patients at a distance from ground zero. Most of the patients within the danger area developed alopecia within ten days of the blast, and within fourteen days had fever, hemorrhages, diarrhea, and leukopenia. Most of the victims who had been within 1,000 meters of the explosion died, usually with multiple petechial hemorrhages and bowel damage. The report included descriptions of autopsies performed by Dr. M. Miyake, Professor of Pathology at Tokyo Imperial University. An important element of this report was a map of Hiroshima, locating the position of the patients at the time of the explosion. This early Japanese report was later expanded to a much longer and more detailed version produced by the personnel of the Tokyo First Military Hospital and the Tokyo Imperial University, which was communicated to the American members of the Joint Commission on the Biological Effects of the Atomic Bomb. Most of the material was incorporated into reports of that body.
Dr. Tsuzuki met with the American investigators later on September 21, and assured them that he would provide both medical manpower and equipment for the study, since no American laboratory equipment or supplies were then available. He also agreed to coordinate and transmit to the American team the information being developed by the Japanese physicians caring for the many patients still hospitalized with aplastic anemia.
An early decision had to be made about the forms on which data would be recorded. Dr. Oughterson, who had been one of the founders of the Connecticut Cancer Registry, was familiar with the design of forms which would make interpretation of the data as simple as possible. He drafted an abbreviated record contained on both sides of a single sheet of paper. Names were recorded both in Japanese and in English transliteration, but it later became apparent that this form of identification was inadequate. Transcription of Japanese names into English was not reproducible, and the lack of a record of the person's home address made identification more difficult. The form also included the location of the subject at the time of the exposure, the form of the injury, the dates of onset and cessation of symptoms, and factors affecting radiation exposure such as protective clothing and location relative to protective buildings. The problem of differentiating burns caused by the explosion from those caused by fire was discussed. It later turned out that the definition of "epilation" also caused some difficulties in separating that resulting from radiation from that caused by thermal injury. In the case of "hemorrhage," there was a problem in separating the effects of radiation from that of trauma. Ultimately these problems had to be handled by the individual interviewers. In spite of these difficulties, only 35 duplications were found in over 6,000 records and, in general, the data recorded appeared to be reproducible and adequately accurate.
Dr. Tsuzuki consulted with the senior Japanese and American clinicians and a decision was made to assign 25 Japanese physicians of various specialties to the team. Fourteen were sent to Hiroshima, since it was correctly anticipated that the load of work would be greater in that city, and the remainder to Nagasaki. Dr. Kiku Nakao, a young hematologist who had already begun a study of bone marrow and peripheral blood smears from patients at Hiroshima, was also assigned to that city. He later worked at the Argonne National Laboratory and became Professor of Medicine at Tokyo National University. The other Japanese at Hiroshima included four internists and a pathologist, radiobiologist, surgeon, oncologist, and pediatrician. A map of Hiroshima supplied by Dr. Tsuzuki was overprinted with English names and with circles centered on ground zero at 500-meter intervals up to 3,000 meters and at 1,000 meters for two additional rings. These were intercepted by radii from the hypocenter which delineated a total of 25 zones (Fig. 2) . Many copies of these maps and thousands of record forms were assembled, along with the equipment which had been donated by the Japanese medical establishment for shipment to Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Supplies for the laboratory proved to be a serious problem. personal libraries of the faculty. Preparations were essentially completed by September 25, at which time the Nagasaki contingent departed from Tokyo; but the damage produced by the typhoon made both air and rail travel to Hiroshima impossible until October 12. In spite of this delay, work was begun at once on reviewing the clinical records and the peripheral blood, marrow, and autopsy slides of 44 patients provided by Dr. Nakao. The airport at Hiroshima had been essentially destroyed. The only facility, aside from a rutted, muddy field, was a single wind sock. The team was greeted, among others, by some badly scarred children, one of whom spoke English and could describe accurately to the Americans where he had been relative to the bomb. From the air, the entire city had seemed to be completely flat except for some concrete buildings that looked reasonably well-preserved, but on closer inspection it was found to be littered with twisted and buckled masses. The roads were littered with wreckage of every description, including many burned-out trucks and cars. Charred utility poles had collapsed and jumbled wires criss-crossed the path. Everywhere there was evidence of a conflagration. Toward the margin of the city, unburned houses had been flattened, as if by wind, all in the same direction away from the center of the explosion.
The group was quartered about 4.5 kilometers from the hypocenter in the living quarters of the Daiwa Rayon Mills in Ujina, which had been taken over as a hospital by the Tokyo First Military Hospital. The buildings, long, two-story, barrack-like structures arranged in cantonment style off straight covered walks, were assigned to the Joint Commission. The group now consisted of six American and 15 Japanese physicians, four American enlisted men, and 21 Japanese medical students. The laboratory was set up and clinical investigation of patients began on October 15, taking histories, performing physical examinations, and doing clinical laboratory work on patients in the Ujina area. The American physicians were impressed by the absence of facilities for clinical support, since blood transfusion, electrolyte solutions, penicillin, and even late forms of the sulfa drugs were not available. After the initial examination of the patients in the Ujima hospital, teams were sent to other hospitals and outpatient departments in Hiroshima. Records and laboratory specimens were brought back to the Ujina headquarters.
It was not difficult to obtain an adequate sample of bomb victims who were still sick enough to require hospital or outpatient care, but obtaining data from those who had had only minor injuries was a problem. Many of these had left Hiroshima temporarily, and others had moved from their previous homes, which had been damaged by the blast. Some of them had been in the city temporarily on August 6 and had returned to their farms or houses in the periphery of the city. The Hiroshima police cooperated by locating about 150 to 200 suitable people from all quarters of the city.
The initial survey proceeded rapidly, since the team was capable of obtaining information from as many as 300 patients a day. Studies of the laboratory and pathological material were much slower. All of the Japanese data had to be translated to English. In some instances, this required translation into German (which was the second language of some of the Japanese doctors) and re-translation by Dr. Liebow into English.
OBTAINING A VALID SAMPLING OF THE POPULATION The original study had been planned without any particular number of patients in mind. By early November, Dr. Oughterson set a goal of 5,000, but later consultation with statisticians led to the decision to attempt to obtain twice that number. This large group could not be obtained by random recruiting, so the study team obtained cooperation from schools and factories, which allowed their records to be examined and students or workers to be interviewed. This information, combined with careful studies of the location of the subjects at the time of the blast and of the nature of the protection provided by buildings, foliage, and clothing permitted calculation of the penetrating ability of the radiation and the shielding effect of various types of materials. The specific information was supplemented by a survey based on the national census taken in November 1945. Of the 523 precincts in the city, 265 were selected at random and a five-percent subsample of this base was obtained. This subsample was surveyed to determine location at the time of the bomb and ultimate survival both of the person named in the census and of relatives in the city. After screening to eliminate duplication, information about 20,586 subjects was available. From these materials it was ultimately possible to calculate the killing efficacy of the bomb and shielding potency of various materials. It was also possible to construct a curve relating biological damage to distance from the bomb (Fig. 3) . The survey indicated that of the total population of about 253,000 25.5 percent (64,000 persons) had been killed by the bomb, 27 percent (68,400) had been injured, and 47.5 percent had escaped physically unscathed. (These figures differed somewhat from those of the Japanese, who reported that 92,138 were dead or missing six months after the bomb and 54,407 were injured, of a total population of 306,545. Thus the Japanese found 30 percent killed or missing and 18 percent injured [2] .) COMPLETION OF THE WORK OF THE JOINT COMMISSION The mission was completed in late November, and the records, slides, and photographs dispatched on November 26 to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology where the final report was to be prepared. The material included over 1,500 photographs, tissues and protocols of 139 autopsies, and the population data mentioned above. Studies continued of the effects of the bomb and of the radiation associated with it on the population exposed and on a control, unexposed popula-tion as a collaborative effort of the Japanese and American services. Liebow returned to the United States in January 1946, and was assigned to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology where he assisted in preparation of the report of the work of the Commission. The final report, in six volumes containing 1,300 pages, was completed on September 6, 1946.
One of Liebow's last official actions was to write a letter for Dr. Oughterson's signature, urging the Surgeons General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to make arrangements to continue the studies of the effects of the bomb. The request was transmitted to the National Research Council and was a major stimulus to organizing the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, which continued the work of the Combined Commission.
Dr. Liebow concluded his diary with the following words:
The use of this weapon as we contemplated it, and then more when we saw its effects, and then even as we wrote of it, filled us with revulsion. We acquired a sympathy, not for those on the periphery who acquired a Prometheus complex and cried mea culpa as a means of proclaiming their own importance, but for the physicists who bore the real responsibility for the development of the atomic bomb and who suffered genuine torment of conscience. Were we, even in the aftermath, accessories to a crime against mankind? Surely death and injury of innocents is wickedness that can never be condoned. But even killing by hand, in combat, while honoring the traditions of "chivalry" is still murder. The crime is of the same kind. Chivalry was crushed and burned when the first unseeing stones and firebrands were hurled. It had died centuries before Hiroshima. We thought also of the 15,000 hospital beds in the Marianas now never to be used, and of the hundreds of thousands of lives, American and Japanese, that would have been the cost of the assault and conquest of the home islands of Japan. Had more been spared than were lost and maimed in the two cities? But why could not an atomic explosion, near but not upon, a living city, have been as persuasive? Even if it was "necessary" to destroy one city, how could one justify the devastation of another? We could only hope that reasons based on morality as well as strategy dictated the decisions.
When we saw the pitifully crippled and maimed we felt both guilt and shame. But was the absence of resentfulness the stoicism of a brave and disciplined people or was this also some reflection of guilt on their own part?
Perhaps there was an element of both.
But once the deed was done, criminal or salutary, there was clearly a duty to perform: to measure not merely the power of a weapon soon to become outmoded or extinct, but the nature and extent of radiation injury in man. Never before had human beings been exposed en masse to this force that surely would have to be lived with, or even lived by. This power could be harnessed for good although it would always carry a threat. In performing this work, we could then, not merely unthinkingly obey orders, but make a partial and uneasy peace with conscience. While the opportunity was born of tragedy, it was clearly a necessity to make the best use of it. We plunged into the task with an inner compulsion for we knew that time was running out.
The work could surely have been done much better by a team selected in advance and equipped with all the instruments of modern laboratory science. As it was, much less would have been accomplished without the expert knowledge, ingenuity, ideas, and unflagging efforts of our Japanese colleagues.
When on September 6, 1946, the completed report of some 1,300 pages, bound in six substantial volumes, was handed to Col. Ash, there ended a still vivid chapter. But while the chapter came to an end we were left with the uneasy feeling that the book remains unfinished -and it continues as a haunting memory. May the evil of which it tells never come back!
